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INTRODUCTION
The Hatch-Waxman amendments 1 were enacted by Congress
in 1984 to ease the introduction of generic drugs into the market. 2
Since their enactment, the Hatch-Waxman amendments have
stimulated a thriving generic drug industry and greatly improved
access of lower cost drugs in the pharmaceutical marketplace. 3
The generic drug industry segment is now an essential and
indispensable part of the U.S. and international pharmaceutical
industry. 4
The Hatch-Waxman amendments provide for
administrative procedures to streamline the approval of generic
drug products, but certain aspects of the Hatch-Waxman
amendments have created antitrust implications. This paper will
discuss antitrust aspects of the most recent changes to the HatchWaxman amendments, in the “Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003” (hereinafter, the
“Medicare Modernization Act” or “MMA”), enacted December 8,
2003, 5 which included the “Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals”
Act (“AAPA”). 6
The AAPA amendments introduced significant modifications
affecting the 180-day term of exclusivity given to first challenger
of a listed patent, the 30-month stay of approval, as well as other
changes to the Hatch-Waxman amendments. 7 The AAPA also
contains a provision requiring notification of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) for
agreements between generic and innovator drug companies. 8

1
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984). See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d
1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003), for a general discussion of the Hatch-Waxman amendments.
2
See generally A. Maureen Rouhi, Beyond Hatch-Waxman, Legislative Action Seeks
To Close Loopholes In U.S. Law That Delay Entry Of Generics Into The Market, 80 (38)
CHEM. ENGR. NEWS 53–59 (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/
coverstory/8038/8038biogenerics2.html. See also Anne Field, Doctoring the HatchWaxman Act (Aug. 2003), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/research/pubpolicy_bulow_
hatchwaxman_act.shtml (last visited July 29, 2006).
3
Rouhi, supra note 2.
4
Id.
5
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2065 (2003).
6
Id. at 2448–64 (Title XI of the MMA, subtitles A and B)).
7
Id. (These provisions are in Title XI subtitle A of the MMA).
8
Id. (These provisions are in Title XI subtitle B of the MMA).
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The patent laws have long engendered antitrust implications.
The Hatch-Waxman amendments and AAPA modifications,
because they affect patent rights, also invite a review of antitrust
issues in light of the latest statutory scheme. This paper will
summarize the Hatch-Waxman amendments and the AAPA
amendments, and will discuss antitrust aspects of the HatchWaxman amendments. Several recent relevant cases addressing
antitrust aspects of generic drug approvals are reviewed. The
balancing of rights between the three principal market participants,
patentee and New Drug Application (NDA) holders, generic
market entrants, and the public, will be discussed from an antitrust
perspective. Finally, future antitrust implications under the 2003
Act will be considered, with particular reference to the forfeiture
provisions in the MMA. This paper concludes that the MMA
amendments will cause substantial harm to the generic drug
companies, more than they will aid the NDA holders, but that the
greatest damage will be to the public, which will likely experience
marketing delays in the introduction of lower cost drugs, because
of reduced innovation in generic drug development.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS
The overarching objective of generic drug development is to
produce lower cost copies of marketed and effective drugs. 9 The
rules pertaining to drug approvals generally are codified in the
“Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act” (“FDCA”), at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301
et. seq. (2000). 10 The Hatch-Waxman amendments provide for an
“Abbreviated New Drug Application” (“ANDA”), 11 which allows
a generic drug company to rely on the clinical data of the innovator
9
For general reviews of the Hatch-Waxman Act and related history, see Laba Karki,
Review of FDA Law Related to Pharmaceuticals: The Hatch-Waxman Act, Regulatory
Amendments and Implications for Drug Patent Enforcement, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 602 (2005) and Erika King Leitzan, A Brief History of 180-Day Exclusivity
Under the Hatch-Waxman Amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287 (2004).
10
See Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
11
See id. The ANDA provisions are discussed in § 505(j) of the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). There are also some aspects in the
patent laws. See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1245.
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company. Innovator companies file a “New Drug Application”
(“NDA”), 12 which requires, inter alia, toxicological and clinical
data demonstrating safety and effectiveness. A generic drug
company seeking to copy an innovator drug only has to show
“bioequivalence” to gain approval for a generic drug ANDA. 13
The Hatch-Waxman amendments provide for a system of
patent listings for approved drugs listed under § 505(b) of the
FDCA, 14 covering the drug product, method of use, and
formulations.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
maintains this patent listing as part of the database “Approved
Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,”
commonly referred to as the “Orange Book.” 15
Generic companies seeking to copy a listed drug must certify
one of four statements concerning the patents on a listed drug: (i)
the listed drug is not patented (a “paragraph I certification”); (ii)
the listed drug’s patent has expired (a “paragraph II certification”);
(iii) the generic drug will be marketed after the expiration date of
the listed drug’s patent (a “paragraph III certification”); or (iv) the
listed drug’s patent “is invalid or . . . it will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug” covered by the ANDA
(a “paragraph IV certification”). 16 In addition to the four patent
certifications, there is an additional provision in that the listed
patent covers an indication for which the drug is not approved. 17
Most of the interesting features of generic drugs, as will be
explained in more detail in this paper, involve the paragraph IV
certification process.

12

21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000).
See Bayer AG, 212 F.3d at 1244 for a description of bioequivalence. Bioequivalence
generally means that the extent and rate of absorption of the generic drug are not
significantly different from that of the innovator drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(8)(B)(i).
14
21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2000).
15
Available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/. For general discussions of patent listings
in the Orange Book, see the faq’s on the Orange Book web site, and also
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/smallbiz/generic_exclusivity.htm, and http://www.fda.gov
/cder/guidance/2576fnl.pdf.
16
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV) (2000). See Bayer AG, supra note 10 at 1244–
45.
17
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii ) (2000). See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp.,
316 F.3d 1348, 1360–61 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
13
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If an ANDA is certified under paragraph IV, the applicant must
notify the patent’s owner of the certification following a notice
from the FDA that the application was accepted.18
This
notification is essentially an invitation to be sued. A paragraph IV
certification is deemed to be an act of patent infringement “if the
purpose of such a submission is to obtain approval under the
[FDCA] to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a
drug . . . claimed in a patent or the use of which is claimed in a
patent before the expiration of such a patent.” 19
If a listed drug’s patent owner brings suit for patent
infringement within 45 days of receiving the notice of a paragraph
IV certification, then the ANDA is not approvable until the date a
court determines invalidity or non-infringement, the date the patent
expires, or 30 months from the date the patent holder receives
notice of the ANDA paragraph IV certification (subject to judicial
discretion), whichever occurs first. 20 This is the so-called “30
month stay” provision.
As an incentive for generic companies to challenge patents, the
first ANDA applicant to file a paragraph IV certification is entitled
to 180 days of exclusivity before another ANDA can be approved
by the FDA. 21 This is the so-called “First to File” provision. The
180-day exclusivity period begins on the start of the actual sale of
the drug, rather than the date the FDA approves the ANDA. 22
Parts of the Hatch-Waxman amendments are also in the patent
laws. As a quid pro quo to the relative ease of challenging listed
patents and the exclusivity period afforded to generic drug
companies making paragraph IV certifications, the innovator
companies are entitled to a patent term extension on one patent per
drug product to compensate for regulatory delays in the approval
process. 23 Thus, the term of a patent which claims a product, a
18

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B) (superseded 2000). See also 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.52, 314.94.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
20
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). See Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
21
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000). See also Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d
1335, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For a general discussion of the 180-day exclusivity
provision, see http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/smallbiz/generic_exclusivity.htm.
22
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000).
23
35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
19
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method of use, or a manufacturing process of a product that is
subject to regulatory approval can be extended for up to five
years, 24 with a maximum term extension following approval of 14
years. 25
Additionally, Congress legislatively overruled Roche v. Bolar 26
and provided that it shall not be an act of infringement to make and
test a patented drug solely for the uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information for an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA). 27
II. AAPA MODIFICATIONS TO HATCH-WAXMAN
In 2002 and 2003, the Federal Trade Commission
published a pair of studies containing significant criticisms
regarding generic drug approvals and the conduct of drug
companies around Hatch-Waxman issues. 28
Both innovator
companies and generic companies were accused of “gaming” the
system to their advantage. 29 The major manipulations were NDA
holder strategies to obtain multiple 30 month stays delaying
ANDA approvals, by layering patent additions to the Orange
Book, 30 and strategies by ANDA applicants and innovator drug
24

35 U.S.C. § 156(g)(6)(A) (2000). MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 2758 (8th ed. 2005).
25
35 U.S.C. § 156(c)(3) (2000). Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1551 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
26
733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984).
27
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372,
2380 (2005).
28
FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC
STUDY (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf
[hereinafter FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY,
(2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf [hereinafter FTC,
INNOVATION STUDY].
29
FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at ch. 3, p. 13. See also 149 CONG. REC.
S8188 (daily ed. June 19, 2003). One of the more spectacular episodes leading to the
FTC investigation involved the attempts by Bristol-Myers Squibb to fend off generic
competition for buspirone. See FED. TRADE COMM’N., IN THE MATTER OF BRISTOL-MYERS
SQUIBB COMPANY (2003) available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyers
analysis.htm, in the section discussing BuSpar [hereinafter FTC, Bristol-Myers Squibb].
30
FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at ii.
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companies to delay the start of the 180-day exclusivity. 31 By
failing to market generics timely, generic manufacturers could
delay the 180-day exclusivity to a time of their choosing, delaying
the introduction of a generic drug to the marketplace and delaying
the introduction of other generic competitors. 32
The Generic Drug Study 33 made two major recommendations:
that innovator drugs should be limited to one 30-month stay per
drug, 34 and that innovator and generic drug companies should be
required to file certain agreements with the FTC. 35 The discussion
of the latter recommendation largely centers around the 180-day
marketing exclusivity provision, because there were a number of
cases where innovator and generic companies made deals affecting
the exclusivity period. 36
Congress made drug reform a priority in 2003 and both the
House and Senate passed bills H.R. 1 and S. 1. The final MMA
legislation was enacted on December 8, 2003. 37 One key goal of
the legislation was to reform prescription drug benefits for
Medicare patients, 38 but Title XI of the Act, the AAPA, made
substantial changes to the Hatch-Waxman provisions as well.
Paragraph 5 of 21 U.S.C § 355(j), which covers most of the issues
pertaining to paragraph IV certifications, was essentially
completely rewritten, a new paragraph 5 was added to the patent
31

Id. at vii.
Id. at 57. Since the 180-day exclusivity clock does not start until the first to file
generic drug company commences marketing of a generic drug, a failure to market
prevents the approval of any other ANDA for that drug.
33
Id.
34
Id. at Exec. Summary, p. ii
35
Id. at iv.
36
Id. at vii.
37
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, & Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003).
38
See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE MODERNIZATION
ACT, available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/liheap/guidance/information_
memoranda/im05-16.html (last visited July 28, 2006) (noting that the purpose of the
MMA is to bring “more affordable health care, prescription drug coverage to all people
with Medicare, expanded health plan options, improved health care access for rural
Americans, and preventive care services, such as flu shots and mammograms.”). See also
Medicare Modernization Act, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES:
HEALTHFINDER, http://www.healthfinder.gov/docs/doc09265.htm (last visited July 5,
2006).
32
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laws at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), and several other provisions were
modified.
Under the AAPA amendments, the 30-month stay provision
was modified to explicitly allow only a single stay for any drug. 39
This was accomplished by inserting language into the statute that
an action for infringement under the Hatch-Waxman provisions
can only be brought for patents listed prior to the filing of the
ANDA. 40 The previous law had no similar limitation, and the
innovator drug companies used this to their advantage by listing
patents after an ANDA was filed, which permitted a separate stay
for each listed patent. Thus, NDA holders could delay generic
entry with layered patents, and additional infringement suits that
would trigger multiple 30-month stays. 41 According to the
Generic Drug Study, this happened eight times between 1992 and
2000, with an additional stay beyond the first 30-month stay of 4–
40 months. 42
The AAPA amendments provided a new set of forfeiture
events, affecting the 180-day exclusivity. An ANDA applicant
must now market the drug on the earlier of either 75 days after
approval or 30 months after submission, or within 75 days of a
decision from a court from which no appeal can be taken, or a
settlement with a finding that the patent is invalid or not infringed,
or else the exclusivity is forfeited. 43
Agreements between drug companies, either between innovator
and generic or between generic and generic, must be reported to
the FTC and the Attorney General. 44

39

See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY LISTED
DRUGS, 30-MONTH STAYS, & APPROVAL OF ANDAS AND 505(B)(2) APPLICATIONS UNDER
HATCH-WAXMAN, AS AMENDED BY THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT &
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 QUESTIONS & ANSWERS, available at http://www.fda.gov/
cder/guidance/6174dft.htm (discussing FDA Guidance on MMA changes to the HatchWaxman amendments).
40
21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (superseded 2003).
41
FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 48.
42
Id., passim (Table 4-3 lists drug stays extended beyond 30 months).
43
21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(D) (superseded 2003).
44
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement & Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, §§ 1111–1118, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461 (2003).
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ANDA applicants, when filing paragraph IV certifications,
must now notify the NDA holder within 20 days of the acceptance
of filing by the FDA. Previously, there was no express time limit
on when the NDA holder had to be notified. 45
The particulars of a civil action to obtain patent certainty,
where a paragraph IV certification is made and the NDA holder
does not sue the generic applicant within the 45-day notice period,
are now more substantially spelled out. 46 The pre-MMA statute 47
expressly allowed for the filing of an action for a declaratory
judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The major substantive change
is that the ANDA applicant must offer confidential access to the
ANDA to help the NDA holder in deciding if there is actionable
infringement. 48 Presumably, this is intended to encourage suits or
settlements between the parties.
The new law provides for a counterclaim to an infringement
action claiming that a patent was improperly listed because the
patent does not claim the approved drug product or an approved
method of using the drug. 49
In a sense, there was a quid pro quo in the MMA, in that there
was one factor strongly in favor of generic companies—the single
30-month stay change—and another factor presumed to be in favor
of the NDA holders—the exclusivity forfeiture provisions. As will
be seen, this Note suggests that the exclusivity forfeiture
provisions in the MMA will likely damage most of the exclusivity
awards for the generic drug companies. This will harm incentives
for the generic drug companies more than it will help the innovator

45

21 U.S.C § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (superseded 2003).
21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(C) (superseded 2003).
47
21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(III) (repealed 2003)
48
21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(III) (superseded 2003).
49
21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii) (superseded 2003). There is also an administrative
procedure for listing a patent in the Orange Book, under 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f), which
permits anyone to petition the FDA that a patent was improperly listed. However, the
FDA does not independently evaluate the patent information listed. The FDA will only
request that the entity that listed the patent make the correction. See also FTC, Generic
Drug Study, supra note 28, at 45 (“Box 4-2 Private Parties Have No Right to Seek the
Delisting of a Patent in the Orange Book”) (discussing the attempts by Mylan to have a
buspirone patent listed.).
46

BERKSFINALEDIT_091706_CLEAN

1314

9/17/2006 5:41:05 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 16:1305

companies or consumers, and more than the single 30-month stay
will help the generic companies.
III. ANTITRUST ISSUES AROUND HATCH-WAXMAN
In many respects, the goals of antitrust and patent law seem to
conflict. 50 Patent holders are afforded a twenty year monopoly by
statute, based on the Constitutional authorization in Section 8 of
Article I, on inventions examined by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office that meet patentability criteria. On the other
hand, the goal of antitrust is to promote competition and limit
monopolies that can be unfair to consumers and competitors. 51
However, these competing objectives are not necessarily or
inherently in conflict, and in some ways are complimentary. 52 As
Lawrence Sullivan and Warren Grimes explain in their book The
Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook, intellectual property
law and antitrust law are often perceived as conflicting, because
intellectual property fosters the creation of market power and
antitrust responds to market power abuses. 53 However, antitrust
and intellectual property are more often complementary, because
both systems advance consumer welfare resulting from efficient
resource allocation, innovation, and technological progress. 54
Patents are recognized as playing a major role in innovation and
benefits to consumers. 55 However, antitrust violations can occur,
for example when patentees attempt to extend their legal monopoly
beyond that which is permitted by patent law. 56

50

See, e.g., LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK, (West Group 2000), §§ 15.1, 15.3, p. 800, 813–15;
Christine S. Paine, Brand-Name Manufacturers Risk Antitrust Violations By Slowing
Generic Production Through Patent Layering, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 479, 479–80
(2003); FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at Exec. Summary, pp. 2–3.
51
See Paine, supra note 50.
52
See FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at Exec. Summary, pp. 2–3.
53
SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 50, at 800–01.
54
Id.
55
See FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at Exec. Summary, pp. 2–3.
56
See infra notes 88–118 and accompanying text (discussing Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (Terazosin II)); infra notes 169–208
and accompanying text (discussing Schering and Upsher).
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The main impetus behind the AAPA, the abuses of the 30month stay and the 180-day exclusivity provisions, can be
analyzed in terms of antitrust law. The 30-month stay can raise
questions of illegal monopolization, where attempts to extend the
patent grant are questionable on antitrust grounds, as possible
violations of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 57 Additionally, the
manipulations of the 180-day exclusivity period can raise questions
of collusion between the generic manufacturers and the innovator
drug companies, which are potential violations of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 58 because these cases often involve agreements
between the generic and innovator companies. 59
The 30-month stay period has been used in attempts to extend a
patent monopoly that would otherwise expire, and therefore
layering 30-month stays can raise antitrust concerns as illegal
attempts to monopolize. 60 The 30-month stay was established to
give the generic applicant and NDA holder the opportunity to
resolve patent issues prior to commercial marketing. 61 The 30month stay is invoked if the NDA holder sues the generic applicant
within 45 days of being notified of the ANDA filing with a
paragraph IV certification. 62 During this time, the FDA will not
give final, marketing approval to the ANDA, unless the patent
expires or there is a court decision that the patent is invalid or not
infringed. 63 The innovator drug companies began exploiting the
30-month stay provision by layering patent listings in the Orange
Book following the filing of an ANDA with a paragraph IV

57
See FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at ch. 1, pp. 3–4. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act prohibits monopolies and attempts to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
58
“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
59
FTC, INNOVATION STUDY, supra note 28, at ch. 1, pp. 3–4. See also infra notes 76–
86 and accompanying text (discussing In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896,
903 (6th Cir. 2003)); infra notes 121–144 and accompanying text (discussing In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
60
FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 50 (Box 4-4), 55.
61
Id. at 39.
62
Id. See also discussion supra, Part II.
63
Aventis Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 558, 563 n.4 (D.N.J.
2004).
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certification, which invoked successive 30-month stays. 64 In a
number of cases, the stays extended well beyond 30 months. 65
Thus, the use of multiple 30-month stays potentially creates an
unlawful monopoly that can be interpreted as extending patent
rights beyond their statutory grants. 66
The 180-day exclusivity provision was created to incentivize
generic drug companies to challenge innovator drug patents with
paragraph IV certification filings. 67 These exclusivity periods are
enormously profitable for the generic drug companies. 68 From an
antitrust perspective, the exclusivity periods raise antitrust issues
as horizontal restraints of trade, because NDA holders and ANDA
applicants may be motivated to create anticompetitive deals and
settlements involving the exclusivity period. The anticompetitive
conduct was from both the generic and innovator companies. On
the generic side, in some cases, generic companies “parked” their
exclusivity by failing to market the generic drug in a timely
manner. 69
Under the original Hatch-Waxman statute, the
exclusivity did not begin until the generic company began to
market the drug, and other ANDA applications were not
approvable until the exclusivity period was over. 70 Thus, if a first
filed ANDA with exclusivity failed to market the generic drug in a
64

This is the subject of Chapter 4 of the FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY. Supra note 28, at

39.
65

Id. See Table 4-3, p. 49 for a number of specific examples.
In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). A related
issue is whether there is an exemption from the antitrust laws provided to Orange Book
listings under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and whether Orange Book listings are a
petition to the government and thus immune from antitrust laws. United Mine Workers
of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); see also In re Buspirone, supra at 368–69. The
Noerr-Pennington doctrine exempts from antitrust liability efforts to persuade the
government to take an action that would otherwise create a restraint or monopoly. In re
Buspirone, supra at 368–69. The Southern District of New York has ruled that NoerrPennington does not apply to patent listings in the Orange Book. See FTC, GENERIC
DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 46 (Box 4-3).
67
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. (3M) v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 778 (Fed. Cir.
2002). See also Section II supra.
68
Barr Laboratories, a leading generic drug company, reportedly earned $311 million
during the six month exclusivity period it had for fluoxetine. Rouhi, supra note 2, at 53–
59.
69
FTC, GENERIC DRUG STUDY, supra note 28, at 7.
70
Id.
66
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timely manner due to a settlement with the innovator company,
generic copies would stay off the market entirely. 71 On the
innovator side, NDA holders have been tempted to enter into
agreements with generic companies to pay the generics to defer
marketing in order to keep generic competitors off the market. 72
Another feature of Hatch-Waxman are the declaratory
judgment provisions, in which Congress attempted to create a
cause of action for generic market entrants to clarify the patent
landscape prior to marketing. As will be seen, these actions have
become an important weapon for attacking the 180-day exclusivity
period. 73
IV. AGREEMENTS TO DELAY THE MARKETING OF GENERIC DRUGS
A. Agreements Outside the Scope of a Patent Grant As An Illegal
Restraint of Trade
As a consequence of the threat to innovator drugs by generic
companies seeking the 180-day exclusivity period, the innovator
companies, in several instances, approached generic companies
with attempts to make deals to defer the introduction of the generic
drug. Two significant recent cases in this area are In re Cardizem
CD Antitrust Litigation 74 and In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride
Antitrust Litigation. 75
In the Cardizem CD case, an agreement held to be outside the
statutory grant of a patent was condemned as a per se antitrust
violation. Andrx Pharmaceuticals filed an ANDA to sell a generic
copy of Cardizem CD, a once per day extended release form of
diltiazem hydrochloride, a drug indicated for cardiovascular

71

Id.
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2003).
73
See infra notes 248–277 and accompanying text (discussing sertraline in Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer II), 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) and
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA (Teva v. FDA III), 398 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2005)).
74
In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d at 896.
75
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y.
2005).
72
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disease. 76 Cardizem CD was manufactured by Hoechst Marion
Roussel (“HMR,” now part of Sanofi-Aventis Pharmaceuticals).
In September 1995, Andrx filed the first ANDA for Cardizem CD
with a paragraph IV certification, entitling it to the 180-day
exclusivity period once Andrx began marketing its copy of the
drug. 77 The patent at issue, U.S. 5,470,584, (the ’584 patent)
claimed the dissolution profile of the extended release
formulation. 78 HMR sued Andrx in January 1996 for patent
infringement, triggering the 30-month stay of approval, which
would expire in July 1998. 79 Andrx counterclaimed with antitrust
and unfair competition allegations against HMR. 80
On September 15, 1997, the FDA tentatively approved Andrx’s
ANDA, indicating that the drug could be marketed on the earlier
date of a court decision favorable to Andrx on the infringement
suit, or the expiry of the 30-month stay. 81 However, on September
24, 1997, HMR and Andrx entered into an agreement, whereby
Andrx agreed not to market its generic version of Cardizem CD
until the earliest of: (1) a favorable and unappealable court
decision that Andrx did not infringe the patent; (2) HMR and
Andrx entered into a license agreement; or (3) HMR entered into a
license agreement with a third party. Andrx further agreed to drop
its antitrust and unfair competition claims against HMR, and it
would retain its 180-day exclusivity. In return, HMR agreed to
pay Andrx $10 million per quarter after Andrx received final
approval, and $100 million, per year, less the quarterly payments,
until the patent suit was resolved. 82
HMR began making payments to Andrx in July 1998, on the
expiry of the statutory 30-month stay. 83 Andrx’s product was
reformulated and received final approval for marketing in June
1999. By this time, HMR had paid Andrx $89 million, 84 and the
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

In re Cardizem, 332 F.3d at 901–02.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Id.
Id.
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agreement delayed the introduction of a generic copy of Cardizem
CD for 11 months.
A number of antitrust lawsuits were filed in this matter, as
early as August, 1998, all of which were consolidated into the
federal district court for the Eastern District of Michigan. 85 The
central holding was that the agreement to delay the introduction of
Andrx’s generic version of Cardizem CD was a “classic example
of a per se illegal restraint of trade,” because Andrx had designed
around the ’584 patent. 86 Thus, the agreement fell outside the
scope of the patent grant. 87
A similar situation occurred in Valley Drug Company v.
Geneva Pharmaceutical, Inc. (“Terazosin II”), 88 where the court
held that an agreement based on invalid patents was likewise
illegal because the agreement was not based on valid patent claims.
In Terzosin II, 89 patent validity was central to the antitrust
analysis.
Terazosin, a drug for high blood pressure and benign prostatic
hyperplasia, was first marketed by Abbott under the brand name
Hytrin in 1987. 90 In 1993, Geneva Pharmaceuticals filed several
ANDA’s to manufacture a generic version of Terazosin. Then, in
1996, Abbott Laboratories obtained an additional patent, U.S.
5,504,207 (the “’207 patent”), claiming polymorphic forms of the
drug substance, 91 and Geneva filed a paragraph IV certification
against that patent. 92
Abbott sued Geneva for patent
93
infringement, and Geneva won a motion for summary judgment

85

Id.
Id. at 908. For a general discussion of per se restraints of trade, noting that a per se
restraint is a horizontal restraint so “inherently anticompetitive” that inquiry into the harm
caused is unnecessary, see id. at 907 (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)).
87
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 907–08 (6th Cir. 2003).
88
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Terazosin II), 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.
2003).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1298.
91
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin III), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1289 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
92
Id. at 1289.
93
Id.
86
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on a claim that the ’207 patent was invalid because of an “on-sale
bar” under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). 94
Abbott and Geneva then entered into an agreement to defer
marketing of Geneva’s Terazosin until either another generic
entered the market or there was an appellate judgment. 95 Abbott
agreed to pay into an escrow account $4.5 million per month
beginning in April, 1998, until the question was settled. 96 The
agreement lasted until August of 1999, and most of the funds in the
escrow account were returned to Abbott. 97 The Agreements were
apparently terminated in response to an FTC investigation. 98
Geneva thereupon launched its generic Terazosin in August
1999. 99
Antitrust plaintiffs, which included drug wholesalers, drug
store chains, health insurers, and individuals, brought suit alleging
antitrust violations. Judge Seitz of the Southern District of Florida
granted plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment,100
concluding that the Agreements were per se violations of section 1
of the Sherman Act because they were geographic market
allocation agreements between horizontal competitors, essentially
allocating the entire market to Abbott, who shared its profits with
other cartel members during the life of the agreement. 101 Judge
Seitz’s opinion concluded that the “defendants’ horizontal market
allocation agreements would tend to inhibit domestic output and
price competition without creating efficiencies for American
consumers, and the defendants have not adduced sufficient facts to
place the illegality of their restraints in genuine dispute.” 102

94

Id at 1289–90.
Id. at 1290–91.
96
Id. at 1291.
97
As of the termination date, there was $49.5 million in the escrow account, and under
the terms of the termination agreement, $45 million was returned to Abbott. Id.
98
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Terazosin II), 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.
2003) .
99
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin III), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1291 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
100
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin I), 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340
(S.D. Fla. 2000).
101
Terazosin II, 344 F.3d at 1301.
102
Terazosin I, 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1354.
95
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The court identified several elements of the agreement as
anticompetitive, including Geneva’s agreement not to market
tablets and capsules of Terazosin until the agreement terminated,
and Geneva’s promise to aid Abbott in opposing the entry of other
generic Terazosin products. 103 Defendants Geneva and Abbott
appealed to the 11th Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in
concluding that the Agreements were per se violations of the
Sherman Act and that issues of material fact were still in
dispute. 104 The defendants argued that there were pro-competitive
justifications that warrant analysis under the rule of reason, and
that patent litigation settlements must be analyzed under the ruleof-reason unless it is shown that the settlements were a sham. 105
The 11th Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court.
They concluded:
[E]xposing settling parties to antitrust liability for the
exclusionary effects of a settlement reasonably within the
scope of the patent merely because the patent is
subsequently declared invalid would undermine the patent
incentives. Patent litigation is too complex and the results
too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast whether
enforcing the exclusionary right through settlement will
expose them to treble damages if the patent immunity were
destroyed by the mere invalidity of the patent. 106
Thus, the 11th Circuit concluded that a settlement within the
scope of a valid patent could not be subject to per se antitrust
condemnation. 107 Restricting settlement options would increase
the cost of patent enforcement and impair incentives for disclosure
and innovation. 108 Furthermore, this is in accordance with Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machine & Chemical
Corporation, which stated that permitting antitrust liability on a

103
104
105
106
107
108

Terazosin II, 344 F.3d at 1301–02.
Id. at 1303.
Id.
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1309, 1314.
Id. at 1308.
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mere showing of invalidity can “chill the disclosure of inventions”
by obtaining patents because of fear of punitive consequences. 109
One of the most significant factors in Terazosin II is that the
Court distinguished anticompetitive conduct within and without of
the patent regime. 110 Both per se and rule of reason analysis were
noted to assess the anticompetitive effects of particular conduct,
but this court concluded that in patent cases a different standard of
analysis was needed, that assesses the extent to which
anticompetitive conduct undermines innovation and disclosure, or
the extent to which the patent laws shield patentees and potential
infringers with whom they settle from antitrust liability. 111 Thus,
this court held that there was a patent exception for antitrust
liability, but that exception was limited by the terms of the patent
and the statutory rights granted to the patentee. 112 In other words,
the 11th Circuit seemed to be advocating for a special standard of
review where the alleged restraints involve patented products.
The court stated that the appropriate issues on remand would
likely involve an identification of the protection afforded by the
patents, the relevant FDA law, and whether or not the agreements
reflected a reasonable implementation of these factors.113
However, on remand, Judge Seitz of the Southern District of
Florida again held, under the Terazosin II instructions, that the
Agreements violated § 1 of the Sherman Act because the scope of
the Agreements exceeded the scope of the protections afforded to
Abbott under the ’207 patent. 114 The district court repeated the
holding that the agreements were per se violations of § 1 of the
Sherman Act because the horizontal market allocation was so
obviously anticompetitive and was an unreasonable restraint of
trade. 115 The district court appeared to disregard the instruction of
109
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 180
(1965).
110
Terazosin II, 344 F.3d at 1311 (citing to “accommodation of differing policies” of
patent and non-patent exclusionary conduct in Walker Process, 382 U.S. 172).
111
Id. at 1311.
112
Id. at 1312.
113
Id.
114
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Terazosin III), 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1319 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
115
Id.

BERKSFINALEDIT_091706_CLEAN

2006]

GENERICS INCENTIVES OUT THE WINDOW

9/17/2006 5:41:05 PM

1323

a new standard of review, as suggested in Terazosin II, in making
this decision. A major factor in this holding was the questionable
validity of the ’207 patent, which “was likely to be invalidated by
the district court.” 116 This opinion, that the ’207 was likely
invalid, was in turn a major factor in the holding that the
agreements exceeded the scope of the patent, and that the
agreements did not represent a reasonable interpretation of the
patent protections. 117
To date, this case tells us that basing a reverse payment
agreement on a patent of questionable validity will likely incur a
holding of an antitrust violation. Thus, this case to a large extent
fulfills the hypothetical posed at the end of the Ciprofloxacin
case, 118 that reliance on a patent where the validity is questionable,
and there was a strong case for invalidity, is a risky strategy. This
puts generic companies in a bind, because they should balance the
desire to zealously invalidate innovator patents with the possibility
that they can make a deal with the innovator. If the case for
invalidity case is too strong, the deal will be subject to antitrust
liability. By contrast, if the generic company thought that a deal
with an innovator was possible, they might not pursue an
aggressive invalidity strategy, and would pursue some other
colorable, but possibly less than zealous, strategy for getting an
ANDA approval with a paragraph IV certification.
B. Agreements Within the Scope of the Patent Grant Do Not Incur
Antitrust Liability
In contrast to the Cardizem CD 119 and Terazosin II 120 cases,
where agreements among innovator and generic drug companies
outside the scope of patent claims incurred antitrust liability, other
cases where the agreements were held to be within the scope of
patent claims were upheld with no valid antitrust claims. In the
case of Ciprofloxacin, an agreement between the innovator and a
116

Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1307–68.
118
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y.
2005). See also infra note 144 and accompanying text.
119
In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
120
Terazosin II, 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
117
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generic drug company was held to be within the claim scope, and
the antitrust plaintiffs were unsuccessful. 121 Ciprofloxacin is a
quinolone antibacterial, used for the treatment of infections, and
was first marketed in 1987 by Miles Laboratories, the U.S.
predecessor to Bayer Pharmaceuticals. The main patent covering
the product was U.S. 4,670,444 (the “’444 patent”), 122 expiry
December 9, 2003. 123 Barr Laboratories filed an ANDA in
October 1991, with a paragraph IV certification to the ’444 patent,
contending that it was invalid and unenforceable, and notified
Bayer in December 1991 as required by the Hatch-Waxman
amendments. 124 Bayer sued Barr in the Southern District of New
York for patent infringement. 125 The 30-month stay would have
expired in July 1994, but the parties agreed to extend the stay until
the case was settled. 126
On January 8, 1997, Bayer and Barr settled just before trial,127
with an agreement whereby Barr acknowledged the validity of the
’444 patent, 128 and in return Bayer made an immediate payment to
Barr of $49.1 million, and quarterly payments of about $15 million
until the ’444 patent expired. 129 Bayer ultimately paid Barr $398
million under this agreement. 130
Antitrust plaintiffs, including unions, drug wholesalers, and
individuals, sued alleging antitrust violations, arguing that the 1997
agreements violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. 131 The plaintiffs
121
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
122
Id. at 518.
123
Id. at 519.
124
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro I), 166 F. Supp. 2d 740,
744 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
125
Id. The case has no citation for the original Hatch-Waxman action for patent
infringement, filed in the Southern District of New York, Jan. 16, 1992, probably because
the parties settled without a decision. Id. The Eastern District decision cited here was the
antitrust action.
126
Id.
127
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro III), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514,
519 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
128
Cipro I, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
129
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro II), 261 F. Supp. 2d 188,
196 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
130
Id.
131
Cipro III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 517.
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alleged that “but for” the Agreements, generic ciprofloxacin would
have appeared in 1997, many years earlier than it was actually
marketed generically. 132 Barr received tentative approval to
market ciprofloxacin in January 1995, and reportedly received full
approval in January 1997. 133
The payments here, termed
“reverse,” “exit” or “exclusion payments,” 134 have an
anticompetitive appearance because they appear to offer nothing
by the recipient of the payments in return, other than staying off
the market, which preserves a monopoly that would otherwise be
extinguished. The defense was that the 1997 agreements did not
extend the beyond the scope of the ’444 patent.135
In the Cipro II decision, Judge David Trager of the Eastern
District of New York held that there was no per se violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act by the Bayer-Barr agreements
because the exclusionary effect of the agreements were within the
scope of the ’444 patent. 136 However, the decision left open the
possibility that a rule-of-reason analysis could find a Sherman Act
violation. 137 In the Cipro III decision, Judge Trager held that in
the ciprofloxacin market, Bayer had market power, but the ’444
patent gave Bayer the right to exclude others during the term of the
patent, 138 and that a validity inquiry was not necessary because
conduct within the scope of a patent is exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. 139 Judge Trager noted that there was “no legal basis for
restricting the rights of patentees to choose their enforcement
vehicle” such as a settlement agreement or litigation of a

132

According to the FDA’s website, generic ciprofloxacin was not finally approved for
marketing until June 9, 2004. Ciprofloxacin: Label and Approval History, DRUGS @
FDA,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=
Search.Label_ApprovalHistory#apphist (last visited July 29, 2006).
133
Cipro I, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 744.
134
Cipro III, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
135
Id. at 517.
136
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig. (Cipro II), 261 F. Supp. 2d 188,
196, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
137
The rule-of-reason analysis was litigated in Cipro III. 363 F. Supp. 2d 514. A ruleof-reason analysis balances the alleged adverse effects of the conduct with its
procompetitive benefits. See id. at 520 (discussing the application of a rule-of-reason
analysis).
138
Id. at 523–24.
139
Id. at 530.
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challenged patent. 140 The parties may sensibly conclude that either
course of action was more appropriate. 141 Since the plaintiffs did
not challenge the validity of the ’444 patent, 142 it was presumed to
be valid, the settlement was held to be proper and within the patent
scope. 143 Because the plaintiffs did not show that the agreements
had anti-competitive effects beyond the scope of the ’444 patent,
the rule of reason analysis failed. 144 Thus, the mere payment of
money to keep an otherwise patented product off the market does
not prove an anticompetitive or adverse effect on the market.
Significantly, Judge Trager’s reasoning was predicated on a
presumption of patent validity. Indeed, it is not clear if the original
patent challenge at the Southern District of New York would have
succeeded in invaliding the patent. One can infer that Judge
Trager would have felt differently in a situation in which the patent
facially appeared to be invalid. In the Ciprofloxacin litigation, the
antitrust plaintiffs did not argue the validity of the patent, only the
antitrust implications of the Agreements. In a case where the
patent validity was in question presumably the outcome would be
the opposite, since the monopoly of a patent ends if it is declared
invalid, so any agreement to extend a facially invalid patent could
be held to exceed the scope of the patent. The issue gets sticky,
however, because patent validity, and indeed any judicial
proceeding, engenders unpredictable outcomes.
A similar situation, where the validity of exclusionary
agreements within the scope of valid patent claims was upheld,
involved tamoxifen, a drug for breast cancer.145 In 1987, Barr
Laboratories filed the first ANDA for tamoxifen containing a
140

Id. at 531–32.
Id. at 532 (citing T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross Co., 449 F. Supp. 813, 827 (D.R.I.
1978), aff’d 587 F.2d 533 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 S. Ct. (2000)).
142
Id. at 531.
143
Id. at 540.
144
Id. at 541. In addition, Judge Trager held that consumers, who were antitrust
plaintiffs in this case, had no standing to sue because “consumers . . . who may feel that
they are being charged supracompetitive prices by the patentee have no cause of action to
invalidate the patent.” Id.
145
See generally In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig. (Tamoxifen III), 429 F.3d 370
(2d Cir. 2005).
141
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paragraph IV certification. 146
ICI 147 sued Barr for patent
infringement, and in April 1992, the district court ruled that the ICI
patent in the suit was invalid because ICI deliberately withheld
critical information from the patent examiner (“Tamoxifen I”). 148
ICI appealed to the Federal Circuit, and in 1993, while the
appeal was pending, the parties entered into a confidential
agreement, whereby Zeneca, which had succeeded the patent
ownership from ICI, agreed to pay Barr $21 million, and in return
Barr changed its patent certification to Paragraph III, meaning that
Barr would wait until the expiry of the patent at issue in 2002
before marketing its copy of Tamoxifen. 149 During the term of the
agreement, prior to the expiry of the patent in 2002, Barr agreed to
market, under its label, Tamoxifen manufactured by Zeneca. 150
The parties also agreed that if the patent was held to be invalid or
unenforceable in a litigation from another generic drug firm, that
Barr would be able to change its patent certification back to
paragraph IV to put itself back into the position it had been in
during the initial litigation. 151
The Zeneca-Barr agreement was contingent on the vacatur of
the district court judgment in Tamoxifen I, and the Federal Circuit
granted a joint motion to dismiss Tamoxifen I. 152 Subsequently,
three additional generic companies filed ANDA’s for Tamoxifen
with paragraph IV certifications. 153 In each of the subsequent
ANDA’s, Zeneca responded with a patent infringement suit, and in
each case, the court rejected the attempts of the generic company
to rely on the vacated Tamoxifen I decision, and in contrast to
Tamoxifen I, upheld the validity of the Zeneca patent. 154
In 1998, Barr restored its paragraph IV certification, and
invoked its entitlement to the 180-day exclusivity as the first
146

Id. at 377.
ICI is the predecessor in interest to Zeneca. Id. Zeneca is now AstraZeneca.
148
Id. (citing Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Labs., Inc, 795 F. Supp. 619, 626–27
(S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 378.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 379.
147
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generic company to file a paragraph IV certification. 155 Because
this action precluded final approval of other ANDA’s until the
exclusivity period was over, this action prevented the FDA from
approving other Tamoxifen copies. 156 Barr did not exercise its
exclusivity and continued to market Zeneca’s Tamoxifen under the
1993 agreement. 157 These actions were successful in preventing
the introduction of generic Tamoxifen until the expiration of the
patent in August 2002. 158
Some thirty antitrust lawsuits were filed by consumers and
consumer groups challenging the validity of the 1993 agreement
between Zeneca and Barr. 159 The key contention of the antitrust
plaintiffs was that the agreement allowed Zeneca and Barr to
circumvent the district court invalidation of the Zeneca patent in
Tamoxifen I, which the plaintiffs asserted would have been
affirmed at the Federal Circuit. 160 The affirmance would have
triggered the 180 day exclusivity period, and other generic
companies would have marketed lower cost Tamoxifen copies
several years earlier than they actually entered the market. 161
The defendants were granted a motion to dismiss the class
action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, under Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6). 162 The district court reasoned
that a patent holder may settle with a potential infringer without
offending the Sherman Act, provided that the agreement does act
beyond the limits of the patent monopoly. 163
The antitrust plaintiffs appealed, but the Second Circuit upheld
the district court. 164 The major findings were that the settlement

155

Id.
Id. at 380.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Id. The suits were consolidated as a class action in the Eastern District of New York.
In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig. (Tamoxifen II), 277 F. Supp. 2d 121 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
160
Tamoxifen III, 429 F.3d at 380–81.
161
Id. at 379–80.
162
Id. at 381 (citing Tamoxifen II, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 140).
163
Id. at 381.
164
Id. at 405. The decision was a 2-1 plurality written by Judge Sack. Judge Pooler
dissented, and would have reversed the motion to dismiss and remanded for trial. Id.
156
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and vacatur of the Tamoxifen I litigation was not an antitrust
violation, 165 that the reverse payments were proper in scope and
size, in that under Hatch-Waxman, generic challengers gain
considerable leverage, which redistributes risk assessments, 166 that
the settlement agreement did not extend the patent monopoly, 167
and that Barr’s claim to the 180 day exclusivity period was not an
antitrust violation. 168 The key finding, for the purpose of this
paper, of both the district court and appeal court, is that an
agreement that does not exceed the scope of the patent grant will
not create an antitrust violation.
Another significant reverse payments case with significant
lessons for the industry involved extended release potassium
chloride (“Schering”). 169 As with Terazosin and Tamoxifen, the
agreement here was held to be within the scope of valid patent
claim, and therefore did not incur antitrust liability. In Schering, a
delayed entry based on legitimate patent rights was held to be
proper and procompetitive.
Schering marketed an extended release form of potassium
chloride under the brand name “K-Dur 20,” which used a
formulation patented in U.S. 4,863,743 (the “’743 patent”), expiry
September 5, 2006. 170 In 1995, Upsher-Smith Laboratories filed
an ANDA for a generic version of K-Dur 20, called “Klor Con,”
with a paragraph IV certification against the ’743 patent. 171
Schering sued for patent infringement, but prior to trial in June
1997, the parties entered into a settlement, whereby Schering and
Upsher agreed that Schering would license several Upsher drugs
for an upfront payment, and in return, Upsher would not launch
Klor Con until September 1, 2001. 172 In particular, Schering was
interested in the Upsher drug “Niacor,” an extended release niacin

165

Id. at 389.
Id. at 391.
167
Id. at 400.
168
Id. at 401.
169
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc
denied, 147 Fed. Appx. 156 (11th Cir. 2005).
170
Id. at 1067.
171
Id. at 1058–59.
172
Id. The basis for the entry date of Klor Con is not explained in the decision.
166
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product used to reduce cholesterol. 173 When the agreement was
finalized, Schering made a $60 million upfront payment to Upsher,
plus a $10 million milestone payment and an agreement for royalty
payments of 10% or 15% of sales for Niacor. 174
Another generic drug company, ESI Lederle, (“ESI”) also filed
an ANDA for an extended release potassium chloride product. 175
Schering sued ESI, but the parties settled in December 1997, with
ESI agreeing to delay the introduction of its product until January
1, 2004 in return for a fee of $5 million, attributed to legal fees,
plus an additional $10 million only if ESI’s product was approved
by a certain date. 176 In addition, Schering agreed to license two
generic drugs, enalapril and buspirone, in exchange for a payment
of $15 million. 177
On March 30, 2001, the FTC filed an administrative complaint
against Schering, Upsher, and ESI’s parent, American Home
Products, alleging that the agreements were illegal restraints of
trade and that Schering monopolized and conspired to monopolize
the potassium supplement market. 178
The FTC complaint was tried before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”), who dismissed the complaint, holding that the
agreements were lawful settlements of the patent lawsuits. 179 The
ALJ held that a finding that the settlements were anticompetitive
required an assumption that either the ’743 patent was invalid or
that the generic drugs would not have infringed the ’743 patent,
and there was no basis for either assumption. 180 In addition, the
ALJ held that the payments to Upsher and ESI were not
anticompetitive per se, but legitimate payments based on patent
rights. 181 Finally, the ALJ dismissed as unproven the complaint

173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id. at 1059 n.3.
Id. at 1060.
Id.
Id. at 1060–61.
Id. at 1060–61 n.6.
Id.
Id. at 1060–61.
Id.
Id.

BERKSFINALEDIT_091706_CLEAN

2006]

GENERICS INCENTIVES OUT THE WINDOW

9/17/2006 5:41:05 PM

1331

that Schering maintained in illegal monopoly in the potassium
chloride supplement market. 182
The FTC’s counsel appealed this decision to the full
Commission, which reversed the ALJ, holding that the agreements
with Upsher and ESI violated the FTC Act and the Sherman
Act. 183 The Commission did not rule on the per se legality of the
payments, but concluded that the quid pro quo for the payment was
a delay of generic market entry, which illegally harmed
consumers. 184 In contrast to the ALJ’s consideration of the patent
rights at issue, the Commission used a “might have been” analysis
of entry dates absent the challenged payments as determinative.185
The Commission held that the payments to Upsher and ESI were
not legitimate consideration for delaying market entry, so the
Commission prohibited settlements whereby a generic drug
company receives “anything of value” for delaying market
development activities. 186 The only carve-out to this policy was a
limited payment, not to exceed $2 million, for litigation costs. 187
Schering and Upsher appealed this decision to the 11th
Circuit. 188 The 11th Circuit applied the “substantial evidence”
standard it developed in the Terazosin II case 189 and stated that
neither a rule-of-reason nor per se analysis was appropriate for
antitrust analysis in patent cases because patents by nature are
exclusionary and anticompetitive. 190 The court repeated the
opinion it expressed in Terazosin II, 191 that in patent cases,
antitrust liability requires an examination of (1) the exclusionary
scope of the patent; (2) the extent to which agreements exceed the
scope; and (3) the resulting anti-competitive effect. 192 Thus, the
182

Id. at 1062.
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 1065–66.
191
See infra notes 88–118 and accompanying text (discussing Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Terazosin II), 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003)).
192
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005), reh’g en banc
denied, 147 Fed. Appx. 156 (11th Cir. 2005)(citing Terazosin II, 344 F.3d at 1312 n.15 ).
183
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court held that because of the ’743 patent, Schering had the right to
exclude Upsher and ESI until either they proved the patent invalid
or that their generic copies did not infringe the patent. 193 There
was no basis for challenging the validity of the ’743 patent, so it
was considered valid. 194 Further, it appeared that both generic
copies were infringing the ’743 patent. 195 The FTC case turned on
the substantiality of evidence supporting the FTC assertion that the
challenged agreements restrict competition beyond the statutory
exclusion of the ’743 patent. 196 The 11th Circuit held that the
evidence relied on by the ALJ was reliable, 197 that the challenged
agreement expressly described the payments to Upsher as
royalties, 198 and that the agreements did not exceed the scope of
the ’743 patent. 199 The court noted that the scope of the ScheringUpsher agreement demonstrated an efficient narrowness, and in
not exceeding the scope of the ’743 patent, was not
anticompetitive. 200 Thus, the court concluded that the settlements
were proper and reversed the FTC. 201
This case highlights many important points that sharpen the
balance between the exclusions of patents and the anticompetitive
benefits of the antitrust regime. The FTC seemed unconcerned
with Schering’s patent rights in holding that the agreements were
anticompetitive. 202 By contrast, the 11th Circuit noted that
patentees “should not be in a worse position, by virtue of their
patent rights, to negotiate and settle surrounding lawsuits.” 203
Further, “[b]y entering into the settlement agreements, Schering
realized the full potential of its infringement suit—a determination
that the ’743 patent was valid and that ESI and Upsher would not

193

Id. at 1068.
Id.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 1071.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 1072.
200
Id. at 1073.
201
Id. at 1076.
202
Id. at 1072 (noting that the FTC “refused to consider the underlying patent
litigation.”).
203
Id.
194
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infringe.” 204 Upsher and ESI obtained less than they would have
had they won the suit, but there was no assurance of victory in
court. 205
As reiterated from Terazosin II, “[d]ue to the
‘asymmetrics of risk and large profits at stake, even a patentee
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a potential
infringer a substantial sum in settlement.’” 206 In other words, the
outcome of litigation is never assured. Further, the “caustic
environment” of patent litigation can decrease innovation by
“amplifying the period of uncertainty” around a drug
manufacturers’ ability to bring a new or generic drug to market. 207
Thus, the court held that patent settlements, such as the type in the
Schering case, actually facilitate innovation and competition. 208
This case has important lessons for drug companies. The
guidance of Schering is that where a generic company files a
paragraph IV certification, and there is a settlement involving
payments to the generic company, then they can likely evade
antitrust liability if they avoid the appearance of a simple payment
to stay off the market. Innovator companies may want to make
such payments to avoid the litigation risk of invalidating their
patent, and generic companies want to receive them to avoid the
litigation risk that they will lose and have to wait for other limiting
patents or exclusivity to expire. Ways the appearance of a simple
payoff can be avoided are expressions of a legitimate business
purpose in the settlement agreement, evidence of diligence in
establishing the business purpose, and a limitation on the scope of
any agreement to the scope of the patent. The presence of a quid
pro quo of the generic company offering something else to the
innovator, such as a license to a developed product, will also be
helpful in avoiding the appearance of a reverse payment.

204
205
206
207
208

Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id. at 1075.
Id.
Id.
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V. ANTITRUST ASPECTS OF THE 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY AND
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
The Hatch-Waxman amendments, both pre- and post-MMA,
provided for a trigger to the 180-day exclusivity on a judicial
holding of invalidity or noninfringement. 209 A recent example
relating to this issue involved sertraline, 210 where a subsequent
ANDA filer attempted to extinguish a 180-day exclusivity through
a declaratory judgment action. Here, Teva Pharmaceuticals filed a
declaratory judgment action in an attempt to make a showing of a
judicial decision within the meaning of the FDCA, which triggers
the 180-day exclusivity period. 211 If the judicial declaration had
been granted, the 180-day period would be triggered on the date of
the decision rather than on an expiry of a limiting patent, and the
exclusivity period would run and expire prior to the ability of the
FDA to approve the first ANDA. 212 The effect of this procedure is
to deprive the first ANDA applicant of its exclusivity. There are
arguments that this procedure could be a restraint of trade, by
improperly depriving a party of an exclusionary right under the
patent and food and drug laws. A contrary argument is the
consumerist view in favor of bringing low cost competitors to
market as quickly as possible, and that delays in the
commencement of the 180-day exclusivity period are a restraint of
trade that harms consumers. 213
This litigation involved sertraline, a major “SSRI” drug
prescribed for depression and marketed under the brand name

209
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (pre-MMA). Teva Pharms. USA v. FDA (Teva v.
FDA I), 182 F.3d 1003, 1007–08 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Under the MMA, there is a similar
provision in the forfeiture provisions at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA)–(BB).
Under this provision, if a first filer otherwise entitled to 180-day exclusivity does not
market the product within 75 days of an infringement action, a declaratory judgment
action, or settlement agreement holding the patent to be invalid or not infringed (i.e., a
trigger), the exclusivity is forfeited.
210
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer II), 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
211
Id. at 1328.
212
Id.
213
The FTC and AARP filed amicus curiae briefs in support of Teva (to quash the
exclusivity period), suggesting that the patent listings and settlements caused Teva
economic injury. Id. at 1335.
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“Zoloft.” The background is that Ivax Pharmaceuticals 214 had
filed the first ANDA to manufacture generic sertraline in 1999
with a Paragraph III certification to U.S. patent 4,356,518 (the
“’518 patent”), 215 expiry June 30, 2006, which claims the sertraline
chemical compound. 216 The paragraph III certification meant that
Ivax did not intend to challenge the ’518 patent as not infringed or
invalid. Ivax therefore agreed to wait until the expiry of the ’518
patent before launching its product. 217 In the same ANDA, Ivax
filed a paragraph IV certification to the other patent at issue in this
case, U.S. 5,248,699 (the “’699 patent”), expiry September 28,
2010, 218 which claimed a novel crystalline form of sertraline and a
method for preparing it. 219
Pfizer timely sued Ivax for
infringement, but the parties settled in 2002, with Pfizer giving
Ivax a royalty-bearing license on the ’699 patent. 220 With this
license, Ivax should be free to launch a generic sertraline on the
expiration of the ’518 patent. 221 Ivax was the first generic
pharmaceutical company to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification to the ’699 patent, so it should be entitled to the 180day exclusivity period. 222
Meanwhile, Teva Pharmaceuticals filed an ANDA to
manufacture generic sertraline in July, 2002, with the same
paragraph III and IV certifications that Ivax made. 223 Teva
notified Pfizer as required by the Hatch-Waxman amendments, but
Pfizer did not sue Teva within the 45-day period as required by the
Hatch-Waxman amendments. 224
Thereafter, Teva filed a
declaratory judgement action against Pfizer in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, under 28 U.S.C.
214

At the time of the ANDA filing, Ivax Pharmaceuticals was then known as Zenith
Goldline Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Id. at 1330.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 1329.
217
Id. at 1330.
218
Id. at 1329.
219
Id. Ivax’s specific non-infringement or invalidity allegations are not in the opinion
discussed here.
220
Id. at 1330.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 1326–27.
224
Id. at 1327.
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§ 2201(a), 225 seeking a declaration that the Teva’s ANDA did not
infringe the ’699 patent, or alternatively that the ’699 patent was
invalid. 226 On December 8, 2003, 227 the district court dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to establish that an
actual controversy existed between Teva and Pfizer. 228 The court
held that Teva failed to show Pfizer had taken actions giving rise to
a “reasonable apprehension” that Pfizer would sue Teva for
infringement of the ’699 patent. 229
Teva appealed the district court decision to the Federal Circuit,
arguing that the district court erred in holding that there was no
actual controversy between it and Pfizer as a matter of law. 230 The
majority on the panel affirmed the district court decision. 231
The district court applied a two-part test formulated by the
Federal Circuit for analyzing a controversy in a declaratory
judgment action. 232 Under the test, a declaratory judgment
plaintiff must show both (1) an explicit threat by the patentee that
creates a “reasonable apprehension” that it will be sued for
infringement, and (2) that the plaintiff is engaging in infringing
activities. 233 The district court established that the second prong
was satisfied by the filing of the ANDA, but that Teva failed to
satisfy the reasonable apprehension prong. 234 It is the latter
holding that is the truly contentious point in this case. 235 Teva
argued essentially that listing the ’699 in the Orange Book was
tantamount to an explicit threat and the creation of a reasonable
225

Id. at 1331. Note that the pre-MMA Hatch-Waxman amendments statute, under
which the Teva declaratory judgment action was first filed, expressly permits an ANDA
applicant, not sued within 45 days by the NDA holder, to bring a suit under the
declaratory judgment statute. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
226
Id. at 1330.
227
Note that this decision was issued the same day that the MMA was enacted into law.
228
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer I), 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1791 (D.
Mass. 2003). See also Teva v. Pfizer II, 395 F.3d at 1327.
229
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id. See also id. at 1338. The majority opinion was written by Judge Schall and
joined by Judge Clavenger.
232
Id. at 1330.
233
Id.
234
Id. at 1330–31.
235
Id. at 1332.
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apprehension by an ANDA filer. 236 Teva argued that the purpose
for Orange Book patent listings is to put potential infringers on
notice that the listed patents are central to the product, and that
patents are listed in the Orange Book for the purpose of providing
notice that such patents “could reasonably be asserted” in an
infringement suit. 237 However, these arguments were dismissed by
the Federal Circuit majority, which held that Teva’s reliance on
Orange Book patent listings was “misplaced,” and that such
listings are merely the result of a statutory requirement. 238 The
majority stated: “[w]ithout more, Pfizer’s compliance with the
Hatch-Waxman listing requirement should not be construed as a
blanket threat to potential infringers . . . [m]ore is required for an
actual controversy than the existence of an adversely held
patent . . .” 239 The court stated that under Article III of the
Constitution, a declaratory judgment plaintiff had to show the
creation of an actual controversy, not one that is “conjectural or
hypothetical.” 240
Teva also argued that the MMA amendments establish
jurisdiction without regard to the reasonable apprehension prong of
the two-part test. 241 The MMA amendments were applicable to this
case because Congress provided that they would apply to any
pending proceeding on or after the date of enactment, and the
district court decision was issued the same day as the MMA was
enacted. 242 However, the Federal Circuit majority held that the
declaratory judgment provisions of the MMA Amendments did not
alter its analysis, noting that “[w]e do not think that the cases cited
by Teva support the proposition that the reasonable apprehension
of suit prong of our traditional two-part test is not a constitutional
requirement.” 243 The majority further went on to cite the
Conference Committee Report on H.R. 1 (the House version of the
236

Id.
Id.
238
Id. at 1333.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id. at 1334. See also supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text (discussing the
declaratory judgment provisions of the MMA).
242
Id.
243
Id. at 1335.
237
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Medicare Amendments) as supporting the contention that Congress
did not intend for the declaratory judgment provisions of the
Medicare Amendments to alter the courts’ interpretation of the
constitutional requirements for a declaratory judgment action. 244
Although antitrust issues are discussed only indirectly in this
case, the issues provide valuable insights into the objectives of the
parties. The FTC joined Teva with an amicus curiae that the 180day exclusivity creates an economic injury, in that
if Pfizer had not obtained the ’699 patent and listed it in the
Orange Book, settled its litigation with Ivax, declined to
sue Teva, and refused Teva’s request for a covenant not to
sue, Teva would have the opportunity to gain access to the
Zoloft™ market during the 180-day period that will follow
the expiration of the ’518 patent.245
The FTC therefore suggests that Pfizer’s conduct was
monopolistic and an anticompetitive restraint of trade, suggesting
that Pfizer vigorously defended its agreement to preserve its
pricing power for an additional six months beyond the expiry of
the ’518 patent. However, the potential antitrust violations must be
balanced with the rights conferred by valid patents, and the intent
of the Hatch-Waxman amendments to incentivize generic
companies to obtain 180-day exclusivities as a reward for filing
successful paragraph IV certifications. Here, the ’699 was a valid
patent, and any ANDA applicant seeking to market sertraline on
the expiry of the ’518 patent had to show either non-infringement
or invalidity with respect to the ’699 patent. The burden of
enforcing patent rights is on the patentee, 246 and if Pfizer elected
not to bring suit against Teva, that fact does not imply that the ’699
patent is invalid. Thus, the 180-day exclusivity afforded to a first
to file paragraph IV certifier is not a patent extension of an earlier
expiring patent, but rather a bite out of the statutory monopoly of
the patent to which the paragraph IV certification was made.

244

Id. at 1337. Teva petitioned for a rehearing en banc, but this was denied. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer III), 405 F.3d 990 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
245
Teva v. Pfizer II, 395 F.3d at 1335.
246
See Pfizer, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 429 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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A significant strategic consideration on Pfizer’s part was the
risk of losing a suit with Teva had Pfizer accepted the invitation
and sued Teva. If Pfizer had engaged Teva and lost, the ’699
patent could be invalidated completely. If this had happened, then
Teva and other generic drug companies would have been able to
enter the market immediately on the expiry of the ’518 patent, and
no exclusivity would have been awarded because Teva was not the
first ANDA filer to make a paragraph IV certification against the
’699 patent. Thus, this issue of patent certainty boils down to a
risk-benefit analysis for Pfizer, balancing the risk of losing billions
in sales that it could share during the exclusivity period with just a
single competitor, with the chance of a successful outcome in
litigation. As the 11th Circuit noted in Terazosin II, there is no
assurance of the outcome of litigation, and the “asymmetries of
risk” mitigates towards patentees of extremely valuable patents
going to great lengths to avoid an infringement trial and the
possibility that the patent will be declared invalid. 247 Therefore,
from an antitrust perspective, there is a good argument that Pfizer’s
strategy was a legitimate preservation of its patent rights, rather
than an improper monopolistic or anticompetitive strategy.
A related fact pattern for litigation involving the
hypocholesterolemic drug pravastatin (“Pravastatin”) further
illustrates the potential of declaratory judgment actions to destroy
the 180-day exclusivity. 248 In this episode, several generic drug
companies filed ANDA’s to market pravastatin following the
expiry of U.S. 4,346,227 (the “’227 patent”), on April 20, 2006,
with paragraph IV certifications to several later expiring patents
listed in the Orange Book. 249 None of the generic drug companies
were sued by BMS. 250 Teva was apparently the first to file and
was entitled to 180-day exclusivity. 251 One of the other ANDA
applicants, Apotex, sought assurances from BMS that it was not
infringing the later expiring patents, and despite three letters from

247
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc. (Terazosin II), 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 (11th
Cir. 2003).
248
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA, 398 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2005).
249
Id. at 179.
250
Id. at 180.
251
Id.
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BMS indicating no intention to sue, Apotex filed a declaratory
judgment action seeking judicial clarification that it was not
infringing or that the patents were invalid or unenforceable. 252 The
action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under a
joint motion between the parties. 253 The FDA then issued a
decision maintaining that the 180-day clock started on the date of
the BMS-Apotex dismissal, on August 22, 2004, and therefore
expired on February 18, 2005, prior to the expiry of the ’227
patent. 254 Thus, the FDA proposed to deny Teva its exclusivity
period. Teva sued the FDA in the D.C. District Court to preserve
its exclusivity period and enjoin the FDA from approving other
ANDA’s during the exclusivity period to which it believed it was
entitled. The court found that the decision was not a triggering
court decision under the terms of the Hatch-Waxman statute, and
granted Teva its injunction. 255
The FDA relied on a pair of earlier decisions involving the
drug ticlodipine 256 in support of its position to deny Teva
exclusivity. Interestingly, the parties in the ticlopidine litigation
also involved Teva and Apotex, but in diametrically opposed
positions. In the ticlopidine case, Apotex was first to file, and
Teva was a subsequent filer and sought a declaratory judgement
that it was not infringing. Roche, which owned ticlopidine,
indicated that they would not sue Teva for infringement, and this
representation was held to be an estoppel for the purposes of the
statute. Ultimately in the ticlopidine case, Apotex lost its
exclusivity as a result of the Teva action. 257
The Pravastatin court distinguished several features of the
Roche representations to not sue Teva over ticlopidine with the
252

Id. at 179–80.
Id. at 180–81.
254
The FDA considered the BMS-Apotex dismissal to be a “decision of a court with
respect to any ANDA, in which the court holds the relevant patent is invalid,
unenforceable or not infringed” under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) (pre-MMA). Such
a court decision is a triggering event for exclusivity. Id. at 181.
255
Id. at 192.
256
Id. See also Teva Pharms. USA v. FDA (Teva v. FDA I), 182 F.3d 1003 (D.C. Cir.
1999) and Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA (Teva v. FDA II), 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
38667, WL 1838303 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (unpublished opinion).
257
See Teva v. FDA II, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 38667.
253
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BMS stipulation to not sue Apotex over pravastatin. In the
ticlopidine case, the court had to make a predicate finding of fact,
which was not necessary in the Pravastatin case. 258 Thus, the
BMS-Apotex dismissal was not a “decision of a court” under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, so the 180 day exclusivity was not triggered
by the dismissal. 259 Therefore, the district court granted Teva’s
motion for an injunction to preserve its exclusivity for
pravastatin. 260 This decision has been appealed to the D.C.
Circuit. 261
This was an important holding, affirming the preservation of
180-day exclusivity periods that are critical to the generic drug
industry. If a third party could extinguish an exclusivity period on
the mere filing of a declaratory judgment action, regardless of its
merit or the representations of the innovator company, then there
would never be an exclusivity period again. Although consumer
groups, and possibly the FTC, appear to be opposed to the 180-day
exclusivity period, the exclusivity is an important incentive created
by Congress in the Hatch-Waxman regime, to reward the first
company to file an ANDA challenging innovator patents. The
substantial profits derivable from the exclusivity period 262 are an
important factor in the financial health of the generic drug
industry. However, the 180-day exclusivity period is far from
healthy.
VI. THE END OF 180-DAY EXCLUSIVITY?
A recurring theme in the cases discussed in this paper is the
power of the 180-day exclusivity, as an incentive to the generic
companies, and sometimes as a financial benchmark in the cases
involving payments to generic companies to defer marketing. As
discussed supra, Congress became very concerned over abuses,

258
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. FDA (Teva v. FDA III), 398 F. Supp. 2d 176, 191
(D.D.C. 2005).
259
Id. at 190–91.
260
Id. at 192.
261
Case Docket number 05-5401, filed Nov. 16, 2005.
262
See, e.g., Teva v. FDA III, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 180.
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particularly involving the 180-day exclusivity period. 263 Thus,
Congress created substantial limits on the exclusivity period in the
MMA with the new forfeiture provisions.
The forfeiture provisions have significant antitrust
implications. While the new provisions are designed to avoid
situations like that discussed supra in Cardizem CD,
Ciprofloxacin, and Terazosin, where manipulations of the 180-day
exclusivity led to allegations of anticompetitive conduct, the new
provisions will have other, significant impacts on the generic drug
industry.
The new rules seem designed to take away the incentive to file
an ANDA earlier than 30 months before the expiry of exclusivity,
and do not account for valid paragraph III certifications later than
30 months post filing. Prior to the MMA, generic companies often
filed ANDA’s many years in advance. 264 Generic drug companies
were incentivized to do this under the Hatch-Waxman
amendments, which essentially made the filing of ANDA’s with
paragraph IV certifications a race to obtain the 180-day
exclusivity, by rewarding only the first filer the exclusivity. 265
However, the new statute essentially holds that the exclusivity
period will be forfeited within 30 months of the filing of the
ANDA, unless there is a judicial finding of patent invalidity or
noninfringement. 266 Exceptions allowing an earlier filing that
preserve exclusivity are very limited. One possibility may be if a
generic can successfully invalidate a main product patent in an
infringement suit, which would avoid forfeiture events if the
generic drug can be launched timely after a final court decision. 267

263

See supra Part II (discussion of the forfeiture provisions).
See for example, the Ciprofloxacin discussion supra. Barr Laboratories filed its
ANDA to the ’444 patent, expiry December 2003, in October 1991, which was 12 years
in advance.
265
Teva Pharm. Indust., Ltd. v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 2004);
Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 276 F.3d 627, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
266
See supra Part II (discussion of the forfeiture provisions).
267
In this scenario, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I) or (II)(aa), will apply, and the
ANDA will be approvable on the date of a court decision of invalidity or
noninfringement, and forfeiture provision 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA) applies,
so a forfeiture event be triggered if the generic drug is not marketed within 75 days of the
decision of a court from which no appeal can be taken.
264
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Another exception may be if the generic company files a
declaratory judgment action, which constitutes a legal action under
the forfeiture statute and defers the trigger until the action is
settled. 268 Another exception may be if the generic company and
NDA holder settle without a concession on the validity of the
patent by the NDA holder, and without promise by the NDA
holder to not sue the generic company. This situation is essentially
a grant of a license to use the patent that would otherwise be
litigated, and does not trigger exclusivity under the forfeiture
provision, 269 since there would be no finding of patent invalidity or
noninfringement. There are pitfalls with the settlement option,
such as the chance that a third party generic company will
challenge the patent. 270 Thus the MMA forfeiture events do not
account for a legitimate paragraph III certification far in advance
of the ANDA filing. This situation threatens to take away from the
generic companies many cases of exclusivity that would have been
awarded under the pre-MMA statute.
For example, as an illustration of the time lines under the new
rules, consider the Teva case involving sertraline discussed
supra. 271 If the Ivax and Teva ANDA’s were originally filed
under the AAPA provisions, Ivax would have forfeited its
exclusivity because the product would not have been marketed
within 30 months of the original filing, 272 or within 75 days of the
settlement granting the ’699 license. 273 Therefore, under the
AAPA regime, if a generic company had wished to file a paragraph
IV certification against the ’699 patent, they could not have done
so until December 31, 2003, 30 months prior to the expiry of the
’699 patent on June 30, 2006. If any generic company filed a

268

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb). However, note that in this scenario the generic
company has little control over the timing of the settlement of the case.
269
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(BB).
270
See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
271
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. (Teva v. Pfizer II), 395 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
272
The exact date of the Ivax ANDA is not given in Teva v. Pfizer II, 395 F.3d at 1330;
the date is only given as “1999.” Thus, the latest possible 30-month date is June 30,
2003. The exclusivity based on the ’518 patent, which was not challenged by Ivax or
Teva, expires June 30, 2006. Id.
273
The date of the Pfizer license to Ivax is only given as “2002.” Id.
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paragraph IV certification earlier, then exclusivity would be
forfeited for all generic companies. 274
Alternatively, Pfizer could have provided a license to Ivax for
the ’699 patent, which would not trigger the forfeiture
provisions. 275 However, this is not a fool proof alternative,
because it does not prevent another company from challenging the
’699 patent. If a challenge was successful, that would have taken
away Ivax’s exclusivity. 276 In that case, Ivax would not have
accrued the reward of the 180-day exclusivity period as an
incentive for being the first to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV
certification. A later challenger would not get an exclusivity
period either. On the expiration of the ’699 patent, in this
hypothetical, most likely multiple generic copies would be
introduced simultaneously, causing very rapid price erosion. 277
While this may have short term benefits for consumers, it is
damaging to the incentives for the generic drug industry.
Another problem with the settlement and license hypothetical
is that it puts too much control over the process in the hands of the
innovator company. A generic company approaching an innovator
company for a license to circumvent the forfeiture provisions may
have no indication of the innovator’s willingness to license later
expiring patents, and also will have no idea of generic competitors’
activity affecting any agreement. A generic company can thus
make a substantial investment, and the innovator may simply
274

See 21 U.S.C § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I), stating that if a previous ANDA with a paragraph
IV certification was filed, then the ANDA approval will be delayed 180 days. If the
exclusivity of the first ANDA filer is forfeited, then no company is entitled to any
exclusivity.
275
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(BB). See also supra note 269 and accompanying
text.
276
The exclusivity would be extinguished in this scenario because the patent being
challenged would be invalidated by a party other than the first applicant to file a
paragraph IV certification, far in advance of the judicial decision. Under 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb)(AA), exclusivity is forfeited if the drug is not marketed within 75
days of a decision of invalidity by a court from which no appeal can be taken, on a
challenge by any party. In this scenario, if the marketing date is constrained to a future
time months or years after such a decision, exclusivity is destroyed.
277
See A. Maureen Rouhi, Generic Tide is Rising, 80 (38) Chemical and Engineering
News 37-51 (2002), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/coverstory/8038/8038
biogenerics1.html (discussing the price erosion in innovator drugs once generics are
introduced to the market).
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refuse to deal. Perhaps the refusal would be due to a prior generic
company concluding a confidential licensing arrangement. There
could be any number of other reasons, rational or not. Moreover,
this concept invites ANDA applicants and innovator drug
companies to make deals, which in the antitrust regime are
horizontal market allocations but for the patent involved. It was
concern over just these kinds of deals, affecting the 180-day
exclusivity, that led to the FTC investigations and the AAPA itself.
Innovator companies could conceivably hold an auction, where
exclusivity would be based on a factor other than the first party to
develop the drug, which was the original intent of the HatchWaxman amendments. 278 Prior to the enactment of the forfeiture
provisions, free market forces determined which company was first
to market. The FDA made public the existence of an ANDA with
a paragraph IV certification, so a generic company would at least
know prior to ANDA filing if they were not first to file. With the
forfeiture provisions, there is now a cloud over the whole process.
The 180-day exclusivity period benefits the innovator
companies too, by tempering the rapid price erosion that would
otherwise occur if multiple generics entered the market
simultaneously. 279 This suggests that the innovator companies
may have an incentive to work with the generic companies to
maintain exclusivity periods, 280 but it also can leave the generic
companies subject to arbitrary or capricious choices by the
innovators, rather than letting unbiased market forces determine
the exclusivity period.
Benefit or harm to the public is always an element of an
antitrust analysis. 281 The benefit to the public from the new
forfeiture provisions, assuming exclusivity periods become rare,
will only lie in the rapid price erosion once generics enter the
278

Supra note 265.
Supra note 277.
280
This statement may be obvious in light of the episodes discussed supra, such as
Caridizem CD, Terazosin, Ciprofloxacin, etc., but the meaning here is that innovator
companies have an interest in their generic rivals’ exclusivity periods even if there are no
antitrust issues, such as anticompetitive dealing, in order to moderate price erosion after
generic entry into the market.
281
See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 50, at 12–13, discussing the importance of
consumer welfare goals in antitrust analysis.
279
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market. 282 Conversely, if generic and innovator companies rush
into each others arms, the cooperation will tend to benefit larger
generic companies, who can afford the legal resources and cost of
license deals. This could be interpreted as an anticompetitive
effect, favoring only those generic companies with a substantial
capital structure, not necessarily those that are more innovative.
Innovation should be the appropriate determinative factor.
If exclusivity periods become rare in the new regime, the
forfeiture rules may tend to harm consumers by delaying the
introduction of generic drugs, because the generic drug companies
will have less incentive to innovate and file paragraph IV
certifications without the benefit of the exclusivity period. Thus,
consumers may have to wait longer before they realize the benefits
of the price erosion. This delay may translate to a lengthened
exclusivity of the brand name drugs.
This situation seems to have taken away the original intent of
the Hatch-Waxman statute to incentivize generic companies to file
ANDA’s with paragraph IV certifications, because of the
diminished prospects for exclusivity. The legislative record of the
forfeiture provisions indicates that Congress was concerned with
collusion between the innovator and generic companies by
delaying the commencement of the exclusivity. 283 Although the
Congressional record mentions no specific cases, it appears they
had in mind situations like Cardizem CD or Terazosin, where there
were agreements to delay the start of the exclusivity period, which
in addition to perceived unfair profits to both the innovator and
generic company, also delayed the introduction of other generic
competitors, and was perceived to harm consumers. However, the
way the legislation turned out, important incentives for generic
drug companies to innovate, by designing bioequivalent copies of
known effective medications, and racing to file patent challenges
and ANDA’s as soon as possible, have apparently been
significantly harmed.
In many cases, generic drugs are not simply copy cat versions
of marketed products, but rather require significant investment and
282
283

Supra note 277.
149 CONG. REC. S15746 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2003).
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development. The potential damage to the generic drug industry
threatens to harm consumers and reduce the diversity of business
interests manufacturing drugs. The potential misallocation of
resources is antithetical to the goals of antitrust law. 284 That is an
undesirable outcome.
VII. CONCLUSION
The AAPA provisions of the Medicare Modernization Act
were promulgated largely in response to antitrust concerns around
the original Hatch-Waxman amendments, particularly in the area
of perceived abuses in the 30-month stay of effectiveness on the
filing of a paragraph IV certification, and perceived harm from
collusive agreements between innovator and generic companies,
often involving horizontal territorial restraints and manipulations
of the 180-day exclusivity period. While in some respects, such as
the limit in the AAPA amendments of a single 30-month stay per
drug, the amendments seem to have leveled the playing field and
provided benefits to both generic drug companies and consumers,
while still being fair to innovator drug companies, in other
respects, particularly the 180-day exclusivity forfeiture provisions,
it seems that the new amendments will harm the generic and
innovator drug companies substantially. The trajectory of cases
from Cardizem CD to Terazosin to Schering suggested that the
courts had worked out a rational and predictable set of rules,
essentially holding that agreements within the scope of patent
rights are acceptable and not challengeable on antitrust grounds,
and agreements outside that scope will incur antitrust liability. It
seems that Congress, in its implementation of the AAPA, may
have misunderstood patent rights and incentives to innovate by
coming down too hard with the forfeiture provisions that will
disincentivize and harm the generic drug industry. Generic drugs
do not grow on trees, and in the end consumers will lose if either
the innovator or generic drug industries are excessively harmed by
the new statutes.

284

SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 50, at 19.

